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Abstract	and	Keywords
The	chapter	explores	the	dynamics	of	the	engagement	of	religious	and	non-religious	legal
cultures	in	the	context	of	public	international	law	by	looking	into	three	emerging	models,
represented	by	the	engagement	of	the	Holy	See,	the	OIC,	and	the	Russian	Orthodox
Church	with	international	institutions	and	through	the	emergence	of	normative	narratives
which	represent	this	engagement.	While	this	engagement	is	important	for	identifying	the
positives	and	the	shortcomings	of	such	a	dialogue	between	religious	and	non-religious	legal
cultures,	such	a	dialogue	should	be	seen	as	an	opportunity	to	understand	better	these	two
legal	cultures	rather	than	as	an	opportunity	to	transform	them	in	a	completely	different	legal
order.	The	challenges	on	each	side	are	explored	and	it	is	proposed	that	any	rapprochement
would	have	to	involve	a	realization	that	public	international	law	may	provide	protection	for
freedom	of	religion	or	belief,	but	cannot	turn	international	organizations	into	a	missionary
arena.
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TFEU,	Sharia
Emerging	of	Religious	Legal	Cultures	within	Public	International	Law	since	the
1981	Declaration
The	presence	and	visibility	of	religious	discourses	in	the	international	organizations	is	not
new;	at	the	same	time	something	has	changed	radically	since	the	1981	Declaration,	through
the	emergence	of	distinct	religious	perspectives	on	public	international	law	articulated
normatively	and	through	the	emergence	of	the	notion	of	religious	exceptionalism.	The
emergence	of	normative	texts	in	Muslim	as	well	as	Christian	contexts	also	represents	a	new
level	of	engagement	between	religious	and	international	organizations	exploring	the	nature
and	purpose	of	international	law,	the	scope	and	grammar	of	human	rights,	and	the	forms
through	which	human	rights	can	be	protected.2	This	religious	exceptionalism	is	articulated	in
different	ways:	from	these	different	ways	we	can	identify	three	models	of	religious
exceptionalism,	in	this	study	represented	by	the	Holy	See,	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church
(ROC),	and	the	Organisation	for	Islamic	Cooperation	(OIC).	The	first	is	a	sovereignty-driven
religious	exceptionalism	of	the	Holy	See,	which	is	articulated	though	a	very	distinctive
bilateralism	and	attracts	plenty	of	critical	attention	due	to	the	complex	dual	personality	of	the
Holy	See	under	public	international	law.	The	second	model	displays	similar	claims	of
exceptionalism,	driven	by	close	co-operation	with	the	state	in	the	case	of	the	ROC	and	by
their	parallel	foreign	policy	ambitions.	The	third	model	is	driven	by	an	appeal	to	greater
Islamic	political	solidarity	through	protection	of	Islamic	identity	through	an	international
organization	(the	OIC)	and	its	activities	within	other	international	organizations.	The	three
models	outline	an	emergence	of	religious	exceptionalism	projected	directly	(p.212)	 (the
Holy	See),	indirectly	through	the	state	(the	ROC),	and	indirectly	through	an	international
organization	(the	OIC).	The	present	chapter	will	examine	the	patterns	of	emergence	of	these
three	forms	of	religious	exceptionalism,	their	impact	on	public	international	law,	and	how
these	patterns	of	religious	exceptionalism	could	be	interpreted	from	foreign	policy
perspectives.
The	Grammar	of	Religious	Exceptionalism	in	the	Context	of	Public	International
Law
International	relations	scholars	have	raised	awareness	that	their	discipline,	too	fascinated
with	game	theory,	has	lost	its	ability	to	engage	with	the	impact	of	ideologies	on	international
law	and	international	relations.3	The	unprecedented	and	until	recently	unthinkable
emergence	of	religious	exceptionalism	in	the	context	of	international	organizations,	and	the
inability	of	international	organizations	to	engage	fully	with	these	emerging	trends,	in	many
ways	proves	this	point.
Exceptionalism	is	the	idea	that	some	states	are	not	bound	by	the	general	unilateral
imperative	of	public	international	law	or	by	a	particular	aspect.	A	paradigm	of	exceptionalism
has	emerged	by	one	strain	of	American	foreign	policy	stemming	from	the	notion	that	the	‘US
is	not	bound	by	international	law,	because	as	the	only	remaining	superpower,	with	a
powerful	commitment	to	democracy	and	human	rights,	the	US	should	not	labour	under
many	international	legal	restrictions	that	properly	bind	other,	weaker	and	less	benign
states’.4
Such	forms	of	exceptionalism	are	usually	viewed	by	other	states	as	largely	hypocritical	and
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self-serving,	but	as	Tasioulas	reminds	us,	‘it	would	be	an	oversight	to	dismiss	it	out	of	hand
as	an	important	constraint	on	the	legitimacy	of	public	international	law’.5
Tasioulas	argues	that	it	is	conceivable	to	develop	a	legal	theory	that	some	states	can
properly	claim	an	exemption	without	fragmenting	international	law	with	respect	to	some
areas	of	international	lawgiving,	and	gives	as	an	example	the	question	of	whether	democratic
states,	with	a	strong	tradition	of	commitment	to	human	rights,	are	bound	by	the
international	law	of	human	rights;6	he	also	qualifies	that	any	case	for	exceptionalism	must
reckon	with	at	least	the	following	three	considerations:
•	Human	rights-related	reasons	that	apply	to	a	state	are	not	only	the	reasons	why	it	has
to	adhere	to	human	rights	morality	itself,	but	also	its	reasons	for	promoting	such
adherence	by	other	states.	(p.213)
•	Both	bodies	of	international	human	rights	law	and	domestic	rights	jurisprudence	may
enjoy	legitimacy	with	regard	to	a	given	state.
•	The	state’s	extraterritorial	record	in	addition	to	its	domestic	record.
In	order	to	examine	whether	religious	exceptionalism	could	be	justified	in	terms	of	the
elements	identified	by	Tasioulas,	this	chapter	will	focus	on	parallel	rights	discourses	which
shape	some	of	the	most	distinctive	forms	of	religious	exceptionalism	justifications	in	terms	of
compliance	with	international	law.	The	pluralism	of	ideas,	beliefs,	and	values	in	an	institutional
context	gradually	emerges	into	a	discourse	about	normative	pluralism	within	international
law	and	religious	exceptionalism	seems	to	have	in	some	instances	the	ambition	of	reshaping
customary	international	law	and	jus	cogens	and	provides	justifications	for	shaping	and
reshaping	international	law	in	terms	of	its	general	purpose	and	objectives.	This	is	not	a
homogenous	project	and	is	represented	by	groups	of	states	where	the	raison	d’etre	of	the
political	authority	is	deeply	problematic	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	religious	ideology	which
binds	them	together	(OIC),7	states	where	religious	and	political	authority	supposedly	justify
each	other’s	raison	d’etre	(Russia),	and	states	where	political	and	religious	authority	are	in
some	way	two	distinct	functions	of	the	same	body	(Holy	See).	What	is	normally	argued	in	an
attempt	to	justify	political	or	religious	exceptionalism	is	a	complex	assertion	that	there	is	a
plurality	of	irreducibly	distinct	values;	that	these	values	can	be	ordered	in	different	ways	in
the	life	of	an	individual	or	a	community;	and	that	sometimes	there	is	no	single	ordering	which
is	uniquely	correct.8	Like	other	sceptical	takes	on	international	law,	religious	exceptionalism
attends	to	the	question	whether	international	law	embodies	an	ordering	of	values	that	is	just
one	among	a	number	of	eligible	orderings.	In	reality,	religious	exceptionalism’s	challenge	is
often	clouded	by	a	less	productive	way	of	giving	substance	to	the	repeated	complaint	that
international	law	is	‘parochial’,	specifically	a	western	and	increasingly	secular	set	of	ethical–
political	priorities.	Religious	exceptionalism	in	some	sense	makes	a	claim	that	there	is	a
diversity	of	eligible	ways	of	life,	and	that	unless	there	are	compelling	reasons	in	particular
cases	for	insisting	on	a	legally	established	uniformity	of	standards,	international	law	should
not,	without	further	justification,	impose	one	of	those	ways	of	life,	or	elements	of	it,	upon
societies	already	committed	to	different	ways	of	life.	But	religious	exceptionalism	also
proposes	that	sometimes	it	might	be	necessary	to	exercise	vigilance,	embarking	on	the
difficult	task	of	distinguishing	between	the	(p.214)	 particular	and	the	universal	within	the
domain	of	the	objectively	eligible	in	order	to	strengthen	rather	than	fragment	public
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international	law.9
Religious	Exceptionalism	in	the	Holy	See’s	Engagement	with	Public	International
Law
Religious	exceptionalism	is	represented	par	excellence	by	the	engagement	of	the	Holy	See
with	human	rights.	This	engagement	is	rather	complex.	On	the	one	hand	it	represents	a
profound	change	in	the	thinking	of	the	Church	about	the	duties	of	the	state	to	protect
religious	freedom;10	on	the	other	it	also	highlights	the	reluctance	of	the	Holy	See	to	become
a	party	to	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(ICCPR),	ECHR,	and	other
major	human	rights	treaties.11	At	the	same	time,	the	human	rights	language	dominates	the
Vatican–Israeli	Fundamental	Agreement	and	the	right	to	private	property	(Article	10	of	the
concordat)	powerfully	asserted	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR),	and
not	so	much	in	the	ICCPR.12	And	yet	the	Holy	See	chooses	to	pursue	this	exceptionalist
human	rights	engagement-based	approach	through	concordats	rather	than	through
multilateralism.	In	this	case	the	state	does	not	sign	a	(p.215)	 multilateral	treaty	because
multilateralism	fails	to	fulfil	an	important	function	of	the	law	and	the	role	of	a	particular	state
in	fulfilling	particular	duties.
The	religious-political	exceptionalism	of	the	Holy	See	is	driven	by	the	purpose	of	protection:
on	the	one	hand,	of	the	Vatican	state	from	interference	by	the	Italian	state;	on	the	other,	of
the	Roman	Catholic	Church	from	any	state	interference.	The	Vatican	City	state,	with	no
territory	or	population,	was	created	precisely	for	this	purpose—to	protect	the	Church	from
the	interference	by	the	Italian	state.	This	exceptionalism	emerges	with	a	reference	to
international	law	as	a	system	which	protects	states	from	other	states,	and	is	driven	by
considerations	of	state	security,	rather	than	liberty	and	justice.	This	sovereignty-driven
exceptionalism	is	guaranteed	by	the	law	of	nations	and	a	form	of	religious	exceptionalism
claims	to	fulfil	commitments	to	justice	and	liberty	through	complex	multilayered	religious
rules	which	bind	the	global	Roman	Catholic	community	and	aim	at	arranging	a	religious
exemption	for	the	Roman	Catholic	Church	from	the	national	law	through	enforcement	of	the
two	Codes	of	Canon	Law	globally	in	the	states	with	which	the	Holy	See	has	signed	bilateral
treaties.	On	one	level,	these	bilateral	treaties	protect	libertas	ecclesiae	to	exercise
extraterritorial	jurisdiction	worldwide;	on	another,	they	highlight	a	point	which	makes	the
Holy	See	reluctant	and	yet	capable	of	becoming	a	party	to	international	law	treaties:
reluctant	because	the	Holy	See	cannot	technically	exercise	state	duties	in	the	absence	of
subjects	and	territory	and	because	of	the	two-fold	authority	of	the	Holy	See	as	a	subject	of
international	law,	representing	the	Vatican	City	state	before	the	international	institutions	on
the	one	hand,	and	as	the	Supreme	government	of	the	Roman	Catholic	Church	on	the
other.13	Because	of	these	complex	and	obviously	distinctive	roles,	the	Holy	See	may	be
seen	to	adopt	an	exceptionalist	position	on	human	rights	by	endorsing	human	rights	in	the
spirit	of	Dignitatis	Humanae	of	Vatican	II,	and	at	the	same	time	putting	pressure	on	states
rather	than	religions	to	fulfil	their	treaty-based	state	duties	to	protect	them.	The	religious
exceptionalism	here	represents	two	distinctive	functions	of	the	Holy	See—a	representative
of	a	state	without	territory	and	population	under	international	law,	and	a	supreme
government	of	a	global	church	with	its	own	concept	of	divine	and	positive	law.
This	is	far	from	the	only	context	and	the	only	way	in	which	the	religious	exceptionalism	of	the
Holy	See’s	engagement	with	public	international	law	is	projected	in	the	context	of	the
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international	organizations.14	For	the	purposes	of	this	(p.216)	 chapter	I	have	chosen	the
concordatory	legal	approach	to	illustrate	justification	for	such	exceptionalism,	combined	with
very	contextual	tailored	terms	of	engagement	with	different	cultures	and	different	legal
traditions.15
Religious	Exceptionalism,	Human	Rights,	and	International	Law:	The	Bills	of	Rights
of	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church	and	the	OIC
In	addition	to	the	human	rights	bilateralism	of	the	Holy	See,	several	‘rights	talk’	projects
have	recently	attempted	to	develop	new	forms	of	religious	exceptionalism.
These	‘religious	human	rights	bills’	indicate	a	particular	form	of	religious	exceptionalism
which	seems	to	challenge/suggests	challenges	(to)	the	existing	premises	of	public
international	law	and	international	human	rights	as	legal	tools.	Their	manifestos	usually
present	deeper	and	‘more	cultured’	human	rights	and	appeals	to	reform	the	existing
system	and	institutions	of	public	international	law.16	At	the	same	time	they	also	indicate	a
form	of	religious	exceptionalism,	which	may	be	interpreted	as	a	smokescreen,	a	way	to
justify	non-compliance	with	international	commitments	by	the	states	which	endorse	these
emerging	religious	bills	of	rights.17	There	is,	however,	despite	the	disingenuous	rights
scepticism,	a	genuine	challenge	to	the	international	system	for	not	taking	into	account	the
complexities	of	multiple,	(p.217)	 often	contested	and	co-existing,	identities	which	demand
different	allegiances	and	which	are	not	always	easy	to	reconcile.	New	major	players	such	as
the	Russian	Orthodox	Church	have	expanded	their	international	impact	through	close
collaboration	with	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	order	to	gain	access	to	the
international	organizations,	similar	to	that	of	the	Holy	See	and	OIC.18	The	OIC,	as	an
international	organization	organized	along	the	lines	of	religious	allegiances,	has	developed
complex	forms	of	engagement	with	international	law	and	international	organizations,	which
cannot	simply	be	ignored	but	should	be	carefully	studied	as	trends	which	can	weaken	but
also	strengthen	the	international	human	rights	discourse.	The	most	recent	‘Orthodox	Bill	of
Rights’19	developed	by	the	Moscow	Patriarchate	and	promoted	by	Russia’s	foreign
delegations	represents	continuity	from	the	Cairo	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	Islam
(CDHRI)20	and	presents	another	challenge	to	the	existing	human	rights’	language	and
norms.	And	while	we	can	brush	aside	such	developments	as	inherently	conservative
projects	which	flag	the	limitations	of	the	existing	human	rights	language	and	engage	with	it	as
if	international	human	rights	are	a	competitive	theology,21	one	cannot	simply	deny	the
(p.218)	 impact	of	such	projects	on	the	development	of	new	discourses	within	international
law	and	the	role	such	religious	rights	talk	has	in	developing	and	sometimes	legitimizing	such
discourses.	Despite	their	irreconcilable	theological	divide,	Christian	and	Muslim	(both	Shia
and	Sunni)	organizations	seem	to	be	on	the	same	page	on	a	range	of	issues	and	represent	a
unified	voice	in	the	international	arena.	The	areas	in	which	this	co-operation	can	be	seen
include	defamation	of	religion;22	incitement	to	(p.219)	 religious	hatred;	Islamophobia,
Christianophobia,	and	anti-Semitism;	blasphemy;	proselytism;23	apostasy;	gender	and
sexuality;24	religious	education;25	and	the	rights	of	the	child.26	This	is	a	very	complex
spectrum	of	voices,	which	sometimes	speak	in	harmony	and	sometimes	in	dissonance	in
literary	forms,	making	it	different	to	identify	the	audience	they	are	geared	for.	They	engage
with	questions	such	as	what	it	would	mean	from	perspectives	of	a	Sharia-driven	cultural
paradigm	to	engage	with	the	idea	of	international	law	and	human	rights	not	simply	through
the	lens	of	‘Islamic	law’	but	as	a	broader	complex	and	extremely	fluid	tradition	within	which
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law	and	normativity	are	not	all-embracing	but	play	a	particular	part,27	or	whether	Christian
or	Muslim	engagement	at	a	procedural	level	with	concepts	such	as	proportionality,
subsidiarity,	exceptionalism,	and	margin	of	appreciation	should	be	welcomed	as	an
opportunity	to	strengthen	otherwise	vague	commitments	to	secular	normative	ideas.	These
are	hard	questions	presented	within	the	engagement	between	religious	and	secular
perspectives	on	international	law,	driven	by	the	idea	that	states	have	a	freedom	to	decide
for	themselves	regarding	matters	within	the	domain	of	human	rights.	And	while	it	is	plausible
that,	when	it	comes	to	at	least	some	human	rights	matters,	the	ideas	of	a	‘margin	of
appreciation’,	exceptionalism,	or	‘subsidiarity’	can	be	defended	in	part	in	terms	of	the
importance	of	communal	self-determination,	even	if	the	cost	of	recognizing	this	discretion	is
an	inferior	(p.220)	 outcome	with	respect	to	conformity	with	human	rights	(depending	on
the	nature	of	the	human	rights	issue	in	question	and	the	kind	of	authority	claimed	by
international	law)	on	the	point	at	issue,	such	exceptionalism	can	only	be	justified	if	it
strengthens	rather	than	fragments	the	existing	international	law.28
The	following	sections	will	explore	some	of	the	above	paradigms	of	religious	exceptionalism.
Sharia,	Religious	Exceptionalism,	and	Public	International	Law—the	Cairo
Declaration	(CDHRI)	and	Beyond	in	the	OIC	Discourse
The	key	normative	sources	which	illustrate	the	religious	exceptionalism	of	Muslim	normative
engagement	with	the	idea	of	public	international	law	of	OIC	are	the	CDHRI29,	the	Covenant
on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	in	Islam	(CRCI),30	and	the	Statute	of	the	OIC	IPHRC.31	It	could
be	argued	that	OIC	has	made	a	step	towards	a	regionalism	driven	by	a	context-sensitive
affirmation	and	application	of	the	legal	tools	for	protection	of	universal	human	rights.	Setting
aside	certain	peculiarities	of	CRCI	and	provided	that	a	coherent	interpretation	of	the	CRCI
with	the	CRC	and	other	international	human	rights	instruments	is	sought	systematically,	it	is
conceivable	that	OIC	member	states	would	be	able	to	achieve	compliance	with	their
international	human	rights	obligations.	In	this	context	it	is	critical	to	develop	approaches
which	could	deliver	the	notion	that	regional	and	international	instruments	could	be	mutually
supportive,	and	that	clauses	identified	as	problematic	in	the	CRCI	should	be	read	in	the	light
of	provisions	of	international	human	rights	treaties.	In	order	to	develop	regionalization
rather	than	fragmentation	of	international	law,	any	religious	exceptionalism	construed	on	the
back	of	the	OIC	texts	could	only	be	justified	through	a	parallel	reaffirmation	of	other	treaty
obligations.
Proposals	by	An-Na’im,	statements	by	OIC	delegations,	and	the	jurisprudence	of	the	African
Commission	of	Human	Rights32	show	genuine	attempts	to	deal	with	some	of	these	issues.	In
particular,	An-Na’im’s	approach	seeks	to	explore	the	possibilities	of	cultural	reinterpretation
(p.221)	 and	reconstruction	through	internal	cultural	discourse	and	cross-cultural
dialogue,	as	a	means	to	enhancing	the	universal	legitimacy	of	human	rights	in	order	to	forge
universal	cultural	legitimacy	and,	through	‘enlightened	interpretations	of	cultural	norms’,33
increase	the	extent	to	which	existing	and	also	emerging	human	rights	standards	are
perceived	to	be	justified,	proper,	and	appropriate.	Such	approach	is	perceived	as	an
opportunity	to	develop	an	improved	protection	of	human	rights	in	practice	and	a	context
where	a	discussion	of	Sharia	law	and	human	rights	law	is	not	reduced	to	the	harmony–
conflict	dichotomy,	but	focuses	on	the	potential	for	change.34
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‘[B]ecause	Shari’a	is	always	the	product	of	human	interpretation	of	divine	sources,	any
interpretation	of	it	will	reflect	the	human	limitations	of	those	who	are	interpreting	it,	despite
the	divinity	of	the	sources	they	are	working	with.	From	this	perspective	Shari’a	will	always
remain	open	to	reinterpretation	and	evolution,	in	response	to	the	constantly	changing	needs
of	Islamic	societies	and	communities	in	different	times	and	places.’35
A	number	of	OIC	states	are	under	considerable	pressure	to	balance	between	their
international	commitments	and	particular	constitutional	dynamics	which	imply	a	particular
religious–political	establishment	which	is	not	necessarily	public	international	law-compliant.
OIC	member	states’	statements	often	reflect	both	their	international	commitments	and	the
difficulties	in	fulfilling	them.	Natan	Lerner	suggests	that	this	explains	the	opposition	to	the
language	on	change	of	religion	that	Saudi	Arabia	and	other	Muslim	states	proposed,
particularly	those	states	where	Sharia	was	part	of	the	positive	law.36
Most	Islamic	states	have	ratified	the	ICCPR,	which	contains	the	expression	‘to	adopt	a
religion’	in	Article	18.37	The	majority	of	these	states	have	not	entered	reservations	to	this
article	even	though	this	text	has	often	been	interpreted	to	imply	a	possibility	to	change
religion.38	This	would	suggest	that	there	is	perhaps	not	a	unified	and	consistent	position	or
no	consistent	practice	of	OIC	member	(p.222)	 states	regarding	freedom	of	religion	or
belief	as	far	as	treaty	commitments	are	concerned.39	Cismas	argues	that	a	systematic
analysis	of	the	reservations	of	Muslim	states	with	regard	to	international	human	rights
treaties,	if	read	in	association	with	treaty	body	reviews	and	dialogues	with	objecting	states,
reveals	that	the	majority	of	OIC	member	states	perceive	Sharia	as	amendable	and
acknowledge	that	reform	within	the	framework	of	Sharia	is	necessary	if	they	are	to	comply
fully	with	their	international	obligations.40	The	influence	of	the	CDHRI	on	OIC	membership,
alongside	the	OIC’s	accountability	and	its	obligation	not	to	put	obstacles	to	human	rights
compliance	in	the	path	of	its	member	states,	certainly	sound	promising.	The	substantive
provisions	of	the	CRCI	focusing	on	its	religious	perspectives,	as	well	as	the	stipulations	that
appear	to	strengthen	human	rights	standards	while	responding	to	regional	contexts,	might
be	seen	as	potentially	encouraging.41	An	examination	of	the	mandate,	composition,	and
functioning	of	the	OIC	IPHRC	suggests	that	this	body	could	potentially	influence	positively
the	growth	of	human	rights-compliant	legal	cultures	in	the	OIC	region.42	Those
developments	suggest	that	the	CRCI	and	the	OIC	human	rights	body	might	create
conditions	in	which	the	OIC	could	apply	a	form	of	regionalism	that	would	make	human	rights
more	palatable	in	particular	Islamic	contexts,	as	long	as	this	regionalism	and	the	religious
exceptionalism	attached	to	it	strengthens	other	international	commitments	and	does	not	lead
to	debasement	and	to	further	fragmentation	of	international	law.
If	the	OIC	is	to	be	seen	as	a	kind	of	test	case,	we	cannot	deny	that	the	development	of
Islamic	perspectives	on	the	rights	of	the	child	and	a	human	rights	commission	are	significant
departures	from	the	generality	of	the	CDHRI,	which	would	probably	have	been	impossible
without	the	CDHRI	as	a	starting	point.	Deeply	anchored	to	existing	international
commitments	(sometimes	more	detailed	than	the	existing	international	instruments),	they
could	be	seen	as	a	complex	process	of	Muslim	soul-searching	within	the	complex	landscape
of	international	law.	And	while	there	is	virtually	nothing	in	place	in	terms	of	monitoring
mechanisms	for	the	implementation	of	these	Muslim	rights	instruments,	there	is	an
encouraging	blueprint	which	is	different	from	the	simplistic	approach	of	the	CDHRI,	which
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proposes	a	religious	exceptionalism	justification	in	almost	every	area	that	could	be	seen	as	a
departure	from	Sharia.43	We	cannot	follow	these	developments	with	too	much	enthusiasm,
but	we	must	not	lose	hope	that	such	developments	may	represent	a	potential	for	a	religious
regionalism	which	would	contextualize	and	strengthen	human	rights	rather	than	weaken
them	through	religious	exceptionalism.44	Some	developments	are	certainly	cause	for
concern,	but	perhaps	they	are	also	(p.223)	 an	opportunity	to	redress	the	shortcomings.
Any	resemblance	to	a	monitoring	mechanism	within	the	OIC	really	focuses	on	Islamophobia
towards	the	Muslim	diaspora,	and	has	not	attempted	to	monitor	OIC	member	states’
compliance	with	OIC	commitments.45	A	very	strong	commitment	to	non-violence	expressed
in	the	Cairo	Declaration	has	not	stopped	killings	on	a	mass	scale	in	a	number	of	OIC	member
states	or,	in	the	case	of	IS,	by	forces	financially	supported	but	completely	out	of	control	of
the	OIC	member	states.	This	example	suggests	that	these	projects	may	actually	be
developing	regionalism	and	religious	exceptionalism	with	a	focus	more	on	the	security	of	the
member	states	rather	than	the	justice	delivered	to	their	subjects	through	rights	protection.
It	seems	to	be	a	project	that	binds	together	very	different	Muslim	countries,	often	with
seemingly	irreconcilable	differences,	to	justify	their	departure	from	international
commitments	through	exceptionalism,	amplified	as	religious	exceptionalism.
Russia’s	Commonwealth	and	the	Russian	Orthodox	‘Bill	of	Rights’
A	similar	take	on	exceptionalism,	though	via	a	different	route,	is	presented	in	the	Russian
Federation’s	take	on	human	rights	and	international	law.	Viewing	international	law	as	a	mix	of
cultural	relativism	and	proceduralism,	Russia	has	willingly	endorsed	the	Orthodox	Bill	of
Rights	as	a	non-western	construct	which	facilitates	the	articulation	of	Russia’s	role	as	a
regional	actor	on	the	one	hand	and	its	role	as	a	major	international	player	through	its
membership	of	the	UN	Security	Council	on	the	other.
As	a	regional	player,	Russia	has	pursued	a	complex	foreign	policy	towards	extending	its
influence	to	the	‘near	abroad’—broadly	speaking,	the	former	Soviet	bloc—and	the	Russian
diaspora,	and	to	the	recreation	of	a	Russian	commonwealth	(Ruskij	mir).	In	this	context	the
Orthodox	‘Bill	of	Rights’	is	the	element	which	binds	together	the	Russian	commonwealth
along	the	lines	of	traditional	communitarian	values	and	a	close	relationship	between	religion
and	the	state	in	the	protection	and	furthering	of	such	values.	In	relation	to	the	global	world,
the	Orthodox	‘Bill	of	Rights’46	presents	an	anti-western	alternative	to	a	Kulturkampf	focused
on	‘more	substantial’	rights	concepts	and	protected	from	destructive	foreign	influences.	The
Russian	delegations	do	not	simply	support	the	Orthodox	‘Bill	(p.224)	 of	Rights’	in	the
international	arena	as	a	form	of	amusing	entertainment	representing	a	dialogue	between
civilizations:	Orthodox	culture	is	deeply	embedded	in	the	Russian	doctrine	of	state
sovereignty	and	there	are	several	National	Security	Doctrines	adopted	by	Putin	and
Medvedev	which	stipulate	the	protection	of	traditional	spirituality	and	combating	of	foreign
hostile	forms	of	spirituality	as	part	of	the	national	security	agenda	of	the	Russian	state.47	This
is,	however,	far	from	a	simple	reconstruction	of	Tsarist	Russia	and	the	symphony	of	powers.
Through	the	Orthodox	Bill	of	Rights	Russia	justifies	its	sceptical	approach	to	human	rights
protection	in	terms	of	existing	international	commitments	in	order	to	assert	and	hammer	out
its	evolving	understanding	of	international	law	as	a	system	which	protects	sovereign	states
from	one	another,	rather	than	a	system	which	champions	globalization	of	democracy	and
human	rights.	In	Russia’s	case	the	political	exceptionalism	asserted	through	its	role	on	the
Security	Council	is	backed	by	a	religious	exceptionalism	which	promotes	and	protects	rights,
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but	a	different	kind	of	rights.
It	is	not	an	exaggeration	to	compare	this	approach	to	a	‘near	abroad’	resurrection	of	the
League	of	Nations	system	within	Russia’s	sphere	of	influence.	If	we	follow	very	closely	the
role	of	religion	in	Russia’s	foreign	policy	we	will	notice	that,	at	least	until	the	annexation	of
Crimea,	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church	has	mirrored	the	foreign	policy	of	the	Russian	state
on	almost	every	level,	and	has	often	built	bridges	which	the	Russian	state	was	unable	to
build	(for	example	with	Georgia,	Belarus,	and	Ukraine	until	2013).	It	is	interesting	to	ponder
whether	this	collaboration	will	be	sustainable	after	the	Crimean	annexation,	with	a	Russian
Orthodox	Church	potentially	weakened	by	the	potential	loss	of	its	canonical	jurisdiction	in
Ukraine	and	possibly	having	to	reconsider	whether	‘symphony’	with	Putin’s	Russia	is	such	a
good	idea	after	all.	In	terms	of	a	specific	case	study,	the	present	co-operation	certainly
forges	the	idea	of	a	Kulturkampf	which	operates	differently	from	the	rest	of	the	world,	and
where	human	rights	and	international	law	are	perceived	through	the	lens	of	the	forms	of
protection	of	this	Kulturkampf.
In	the	context	of	this	joint	foreign	policy	project	both	state	and	ecclesiastical	diplomacies
work	together	to	achieve	a	common	purpose,48	and	this	is	reflected	in	the	active
engagement	of	the	Moscow	Patriarchate	in	bilateral	engagements	with	the	CIS	countries
within	what	is	considered	by	the	Putin	administration	to	be	Russia’s	Commonwealth,	as	well
as	in	the	context	of	the	international	organizations.49	In	this	process	the	Moscow
Patriarchate	is	often	seen	as	a	soft	diplomatic	power	in	areas	within	the	Russian
Commonwealth	which	the	Russian	state	cannot	yet	pursue.	In	the	context	of	the	Middle
East,	Russia’s	hard	diplomatic	power	often	pursues	agendas	of	less	importance	for	the
Russian	state	but	of	direct	importance	(p.225)	 for	missionary	expansion	of	the	Russian
Orthodox	Church,	which	becomes	effectively	an	arm	of	the	state’s	foreign	policy	and	builds
bridges	between	the	Christian	Motherland	and	its	Christian	diasporas	and	acts	almost	as	a
Russian	protectorate	of	Christian	minorities	worldwide.50	The	exercise	of	sovereignty	is
closely	related	with	the	protection	of	cultural	and	spiritual	values,	which	are	seen	as	the	rock
of	the	nation.	The	state	both	promotes	these	values	and	protects	them	from	what	might	be
considered	an	alien	and,	therefore,	hostile	culture	and	spirituality.
In	terms	of	foreign	policy	and	engagement	with	public	international	law,	Russia	has
developed	an	exceptionalism	based	on	a	complex	interplay	between	sovereignty,	culture,
and	spirituality.	On	one	level	culture	is	seen	not	as	plural	but	as	foundational,	shaping	the
points	of	rapprochement	with	a	plurality	of	cultures.	Like	Russia’s	foreign	policy,	this
rapprochement	with	other	cultures	is	multi-vectored,	but	Russia’s	culture	and	spirituality	is
not	seen	as	plural.	The	protection	of	Russia’s	culture	and	identity	is	closely	linked	with
Russia’s	interpretation	of	the	raison	d’etre	of	public	international	law.	In	order	to
understand	Russia’s	‘religious	exceptionalism’	through	the	endorsement	of	an	Orthodox	‘Bill
of	Rights’	we	need	to	take	account	of	Russian	perceptions	of	order	at	global,	regional,	and
domestic	state	levels,	and	how	these	understandings	of	order	interact.	In	pursuing	the
correlation	between	Russia’s	rights	scepticism	and	its	international	law	proceduralism,	it
might	be	argued	that	the	roots	of	these	trends	could	be	identified	at	the	point	at	which
Russia,	along	with	other	major	European	powers,	became	alarmed	by	the	expansion	of	the
geographic	scope	of	western	military	interventions.	This	reinforced	Moscow’s	persistent
inclination	to	take	refuge	in	the	UN	Charter’s	legal	framework	and	to	highlight	its	constraints
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on	the	use	of	force.51	This	was	a	strategy	aimed	at	presenting	Russia	as	a	stabilizing	power
within	the	context	of	weakening	international	institutions	and	in	a	volatile	international
environment.	This	stabilizing	role	in	a	global	context	also	implied	a	novel,	distinctively
Russian,	and	distinctively	non-western	approach	to	human	rights	in	particular	and	to
international	law	in	general,	and	has	also	reflected	more	fundamental	differences	about	who
establishes	the	normative	agenda	in	the	first	place.52	Such	an	approach	to	public
international	law	presents	a	fundamental	tension	between	the	northern	and	southern
perspectives	on	order	and	justice	in	the	international	system.	‘While	the	North	is	primarily
interested	in	justice	within	states	and	order	among	them,	the	South	is	basically	committed	to
order	within	states	and	justice	among	them.’53	(p.226)	 Russia’s	approach	to	international
law	represents	a	departure	from	a	human	rights	approach	that	views	individuals	as	the
subjects	of	international	law	and	the	role	of	international	law	as	the	protection	of	human
rights.	Such	an	approach	foresees	that	international	law	essentially	regulates	the	competition
of	states,	constrains	western	power,	and	provides	a	discursive	shield	for	the	Russian	state,
and	is	not	aimed	primarily	at	the	protection	of	human	beings.	In	this	context	international
legitimacy	is	conceived	as	conduct	which	complies	with	a	legally	structured	constitutional
order	at	the	global	level,	as	expressed	through	the	UN	Charter	system.	Compliance	in	this
context	requires	a	focus	on	procedural	rules,	rather	than	basic	values.54	This	now	also
reflects	the	making	of	rights	language	which	the	Russian	delegations	in	alliance	with	the
Russian	Orthodox	Church	feel	empowered	to	develop	in	order	to	strengthen	their	sense	of
exceptionalism	combined	with	an	effort	to	sustain	a	dual	normative	order,	regional	and
global.	Russia’s	re-conceptualizing	of	international	law	through	a	discretionary—a	pick-and-
mix—approach	has	in	general	been	unconvincing	to	other	states.	It	has	been	seen	as	a	form
of	a	fragmentation	of	public	international	law	and	one	of	the	main	concerns	about	this
approach	has	been	that	if	expressed	too	frequently	or	blatantly	by	the	Russian	delegations	it
would	undermine	the	normative	and	legal	regulation	on	which	Russia	relies	in	the
international	system	at	large.55
It	is	fair	to	say	that,	besides	Russia,	many	other	pluralist-minded	states	have	prioritized
their	domestic	political	structure	and,	indeed,	regime	security.	Russian	diplomats	are	not
the	only	ones	to	expose	broader	inconsistencies	between	western	normative	legal
discourse	and	conduct.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	salience	of	domestic	political	values	has	had
particular	influence	on	Chinese	and	American	compliance	with	various	international	norms.56
Mazower	reminds	us	that	even	US	scholars	now	provide	explanations	for	why	states	may
opt	for	multilateral	rather	than	unilateral	policies	on	the	basis	of	‘preferences’	among
bargaining	actors,	rather	than	by	analysing	ideas	or	philosophies	of	multilateralism	in	their
ideological	or	cultural	contexts.57	A	political	scientist	appointed	director	of	policy	planning	in
the	Obama	administration	State	Department	has	suggested	that	transnational	contacts
across	governments	and	NGOs—not	the	UN—constitute	the	real	‘new	world	order’,	and
even	looks	forward	to	a	‘global	rule	of	law	without	centralized	global	institutions’.58
The	‘war	on	terror’	provided	scope	for	more	flexible	interpretations	of	norms	and
international	law	and	a	substantial	international	friction	over	rules	and	rule-making	largely
driven	by	the	exceptionalism	in	the	global	policy	outlook	(p.227)	 of	the	US.	Russian
discourse	and	policy	displayed	its	own	form	of	exceptionalism	which	made	it	easier	for
Russia	to	take	refuge	in	legalistic	claims	in	global	diplomacy.	Until	the	annexation	of	Crimea,
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multilateral	religious	exceptionalism	in	the	global	arena	was	used	by	Russia	to	play	down	the
exercise	of	political	exceptionalism.
Religious	Exceptionalism	and	Engagement	with	the	Idea	of	the	Rule	of	Law
The	above	developments	present	an	evolving	picture	of	religious	rights	under	international
law	shaped	by	an	intensified	‘conversational’	engagement	between	religious	and	secular
legal	cultures.	The	EU	Guidelines	on	the	promotion	and	protection	of	freedom	of	religion	or
belief,	and	a	number	of	guidelines	produced	by	the	OSCE,59	are	also	a	positive
development	in	religious	and	secular	legal	cultures’	methods	of	interaction.	One	of	the	great
culminations	of	this	conversation	in	the	context	of	EU	law	is	the	notion	of	horizontal
subsidiarity	embedded	in	Article	17	of	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union
(TFEU),	which	endorses	outright	such	conversation.60	Let	us	not	forget	how	long	this	has
taken!	There	is	an	increased	visibility	of	religious	organizations	in	an	international	law	context
and	a	connecting	of	individual	with	corporate	religious	rights,	described	by	some	authors	as
religious	actors,61	which	is	shaping	in	many	new	directions	the	ways	in	which	international
organizations	speak	about	religion,	religious	rights,	and	freedom	of	religion	or	belief,	as	well
as	religion	and	foreign	policy	and	religion	and	development.	This	emerging	and	evolving
narrative	does	not	always	get	things	right	and	it	is	fair	to	say	that	this	often	applies	to	both
sides	of	the	conversation.	This	only	shows	that	taking	religious	rights	and	the	very	notion	of
religion	on	board	in	terms	of	a	political	commitment	is	as	challenging	for	the	secular	legal
culture	as	it	is	for	the	emerging	religious	legal	culture(s)	narrative(s).	The	saga	regarding
‘defamation	of	religion’	discourse	within	a	UN	context	leading	to	(and	to	some	extent
including	in	this	discourse)	Resolution	1618	only	proves	the	point	that	there	is	no	wide
international	consensus	about	the	importance,	or	at	least	about	the	scope,	of	the	framework
of	conversation	regarding	freedom	of	religion	(p.228)	 or	belief	and	the	impact	it	has	on
other	areas	of	international	law	and	foreign	policy.	The	broader	margin	of	appreciation	in
relation	to	Article	9	ECHR	in	the	Strasbourg	jurisprudence;	the	placing	of	freedom	of
religion	or	belief	and	religion	and	foreign	policy	as	separate	priorities	of	the	EU	External
Action	Service,	the	UK	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	and	the	US	State	Department
(but	not	the	Canadian	Foreign	Ministry);62	the	merging	of	state	and	ecclesiastical	diplomacy
in	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	the	Holy	See	only	mark	a	trajectory	of	new
trends	in	international	law	which	are	shaped	through	a	very	complex	mosaic	of	interactions
between	diplomats,	religious	leaders,	and	international	lawyers.	In	this	context,	religious
perspectives	on	international	law	must	not	only	be	cause	for	concern	that	they	will	debase
and	weaken	the	existing	legal	instruments.	In	fact,	engaging	with	the	emergence	of	these
parallel	rights	talks	will	help	us	identify	our	own	limitations	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	which	we
engage	with	and	expect	particular	rights	cultures	to	come	to	terms	with	the	idea	of
international	law	and	international	human	rights	as	overarching	normative	ideas.
This	is	not	simply	a	problem	of	cultural	diversity.	All	parallel	rights	talk	projects	present	a
similar	challenge	about	rights	talk	itself,	and	without	the	articulation	of	these	parallel	rights
talk	projects	the	fundamental	challenge	would	have	been	misconceived/misconstrued	or
disguised	as	a	mere	cultural	peculiarity.	What	the	emerging	religious	rights	talk	projects
present	is	a	profound	failure	(on	the	part	of	the	‘religious	exceptionalists’)	to	address	the
central	question	of	the	relationship	of	religious	organizations	and	their	theology	with	the
very	idea	of	the	rule	of	law	promulgated	by	political	communities	and	to	political	communities
on	both	a	national	and	international	level.	This	relationship	is	not	unproblematic,	and	ever
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was,	for	many	of	the	theologies	emerging	from	within	Christianity,	Islam,	and	Judaism.	It
stems	not	from	questions	about	particular	qualities	of	particular	laws	but	from	unease	about
the	legitimacy	of	any	man-made	law.	And	yet	(perhaps	ironically)	all	major	brands	of	Judaism,
Christianity,	and	Islam	have	had	to	find	ways	to	engage	with	man-made	laws	as	legal	tools.
The	emerging	religious	‘rights	talk’	projects,	in	this	sense,	could	be	an	opportunity	to	flag
this	challenge	and	enable	religious	voices	in	the	international	organizations	to	identify	a
central	deficiency	in	their	rights	discourse:	that	they	cannot	isolate	rights	as	a	question	of
theology	without	addressing	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	theology	and	law	with
which	it	co-exists	and	to	which	it	correlates.	Without	doing	so,	religious	‘rights	talk’	will
continue	to	consist	of	selective,	nondescript,	and	not	particularly	eventful	narratives	which
are	difficult	to	follow	textually	and	without	clearly	defined	audiences.	Most	importantly,	such
discourses	will	simply	debase	the	message	of	the	religious	organizations	which	project	them,
and	their	well-intended	message	may	simply	become	what	many	suspect	this	message	to	be
in	the	first	place—a	veil	which	serves	as	a	religious	exceptionalist	disguise	for	states	not	to
fulfil	their	international	obligations.
(p.229)	 Religious	organizations	experienced	in	engaging	with	international	law	and
international	organizations	have	already	found	out	that	in	order	to	have	an	impact	on	the
work	of	international	organizations,	they	have	to	operate	within	the	established	channels,
intellectual	tools,	and	mechanisms.	Esoteric	language	does	not	win	support	from	international
organizations.	Engaging	with	the	question	of	what	their	relationship	with	the	idea	of	the	rule
of	law	is	will	enable	religious	legal	cultures	to	challenge	themselves	to	understand	and
connect	with	international	law	and	international	human	rights	as	legal	tools,	with	their
purpose	and	their	functions,	without	necessarily	having	to	engage	with	them	as	competitive
theology.	In	such	a	context,	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	theological	concept	of	the	private
sphere	or	the	human	person	will	help	us	understand	why	particular	religious	legal	cultures
struggle	to	calibrate	their	own	normative	machinery	to	accommodate	a	powerful	assertion	of
individual	human	rights.	Similarly,	such	rapprochement	may	help	to	understand	why
religious	legal	cultures	with	fairly	complex	rights	language	find	legal	rights	talk	a	bit
pedestrian,	and	sometimes	commit	to	bilateral	rather	than	solidarist	approaches	to
international	law.	The	very	fact	that	the	two	legal	cultures	encounter	one	another	is	an
extremely	positive	phenomenon,	not	because	the	two	legal	cultures	know	what	to	say	to
each	other,	but	because	they	are	talking	to	one	another	and	getting	accustomed	to	their
different	normative	languages.	What	this	conversation	represents	is	the	fact	that	both
cultures	become	powerful	factors	in	the	international	arena,	so	that	we	can	no	longer	ignore
it.	Religious	cultures	can	no	longer	ignore	the	existence	of	international	law	as	something
which	could	be	dismissed	as	culturally	irrelevant	and	must	gradually	learn	to	engage	with	it
and	use	it.	Secular	legal	systems	can	no	longer	ignore	the	prominence	of	religious	legal
cultures	in	a	secular	context.	The	emerging	religious	‘rights	talk’	often	sounds
incomprehensible,	because	it	is	exactly	what	it	is—a	cautious	exploratory	attempt	to	mimic
‘rights	talk’	which	tries	to	accommodate	legal	perspectives	without	compromising	religious
perspectives	on	a	new	stage	and	in	front	of	a	different	audience.	Similarly,	one	could	raise
eyebrows	when	one	reads	intellectually	ugly	resolutions,	statements,	and	international
commitments	which	are	supposed	to	demonstrate	a	genuine	commitment	on	behalf	of	the
secular	legal	culture	to	the	important	place	of	religion	and	religious	freedom	and	to	the
beauty	of	the	dialogue	between	civilizations.	This	must	not	surprise	us:	the	secular	legal
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discourse	on	religion	shares	a	similar	inexperience	to	that	of	religious	discourse	on
international	law.	It	is	a	cautious,	exploratory	exercise	to	become	familiar	with	an	unfamiliar
grammar	of	ideas	and	to	translate	it	within	comfortable	constructions	of	expression.	Farr	has
captured	this	deficiency	in	his	explorations	of	the	reasons	for	diplomatic	deficit	in	the	area	of
religion	and	foreign	policy,	and	relates	it	to	the	ways	in	which	diplomats	are	trained	by
traditional	schools	of	foreign	policy.63
The	same	statement	may	apply	to	the	cautious	religious	voices	which	engage	with	questions
of	international	law.	Their	rights	critique	is	often	trivial	and	disconnected	from	the	nature	and
purpose	of	international	law	and	human	rights	as	legal	tools.	At	the	same	time,	any	intelligent
religious	perspectives	which	present	sceptical	perspectives	on	international	human	rights
and	international	law	(without	(p.230)	 undermining	their	status	as	legal	tools)64	are
obscured	by	the	barrage	of	forms	of	cultural	relativism,	anti-colonialism,	anti-westernism,
and	pseudo-triumphalism.
And	yet	in	this	context	there	are	signs	that	the	apologetics	of	these	religious–secular	legal
cultures	do	transform	perceptions	across	the	divide	in	more	than	one	way.	In	terms	of
future	directions,	it	will	be	interesting	to	see	and	to	follow	up	on	how	a	universal
commitment	to	human	rights	develops	in	close	correlation	with	concepts	such	as	true
regionalism,	exceptionalism,	subsidiarity,	and	a	margin	of	appreciation	in	relation	to	context-
specific	perspectives	on	international	law	which	try	to	balance	religious	and	secular
intellectual	trends	by	strengthening	rather	than	weakening	religious	endorsement	of	human
rights.	The	development	of	a	sophisticated	concept	of	exceptionalism	which	is	not	simply	self-
referential	could	hopefully	emerge	as	a	dialogue	across	the	legal	cultural	divide.	After	all,	a
concept	such	as	that	of	subsidiarity	emerged	for	the	first	time	in	the	Papal	encyclicals,	and
shaped	the	decision-making	of	the	Roman	Catholic	Church	while	also	influencing	the	legal
culture	of	EU	law.65	An	interesting	project	would	be	to	examine	how	such	concepts
translate	across	the	cultural	legal	divide	and	strengthen	both	religious	and	secular
understanding	and	commitment	to	such	concepts.	Similarly,	it	will	be	extremely	important	to
identify	those	concepts	which	were	launched	(p.231)	 and	failed	to	translate	across,	and	the
reasons	why.	The	increased	visibility	of	religious	and	non-religious	legal	discourses	and	their
increased	engagement	with	one	another	serves	to	show	that	a	monopoly	on	perceptions
about	international	law	no	longer	rests	with	the	victors,	and	that	the	emergence	of	intelligible
religious	legal	discourses	may	redeem	public	international	law	and	its	organizations	from
accusations	of	weakness,	incoherence,	and	imperialism.
Jaeger’s	chapter	on	the	Holy	See	gives	us	an	example	of	how	religious	perspectives	of
religious	freedom	projected	by	a	conservative	global	religious	organization	with	its	own
system	of	divine	and	positive	law	may	project	the	idea	of	religious	freedom	by	endorsing	it
and	by	putting	pressure	on	the	states	to	pursue	and	implement	it,	since	the	states	do	not
have	the	monopoly	on	the	truth	that	religious	organizations	may	have.	This	is	one	example
which	can	serve	as	a	model	for	many	OIC	states	and	organizations,	such	as	the	Russian
Orthodox	Church—organized	religions	cannot	easily	implement	religious	freedom	as
recognized	by	all	international	treaties,	but	states	can	and	must	do	so.
The	above	examples	indicate	that	while	there	might	be	some	hope	for	the	Holy	See,	there	is
very	little	at	this	stage	in	Russia’s	and	the	OIC’s	approaches	to	exceptionalism	which	could
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live	up	to	the	taxonomy	of	Tasioulas,	which	could	be	used	as	a	measure	for	justifying	forms
of	exceptionalism	in	international	law.	Both	approaches	have	a	long	way	to	go	in	order	to
achieve	the	kind	of	regionalism	of	international	law	exemplified	by	the	Council	of	Europe
(CoE),	the	African,	or	even	the	Inter-American	systems.	At	the	same	time,	we	cannot	remain
intellectually	insincere	and	pretend	that	the	two	cultures	have	not	become	more	intertwined
than	we	are	prepared	to	admit.	And	just	as	the	UDHR’s	time	was	right	to	channel	the
emerging	energy	into	a	groundbreaking	text,	and	the	1981	Declaration	produced	an
important	transitional	compromise,	it	is	now	becoming	more	critical	than	ever	before	to
capture	the	momentum	of	intellectual	engagement	about	international	law,	foreign	policy,
and	freedom	of	religion	or	belief.	We	must	not	be	too	optimistic	about	the	projects	which
emerge	on	either	side	in	order	to	find	such	a	narrative.	They	often	sound	either	too
politically	correct	or	too	self-referential—or	too	defensive,	which	is	to	be	expected,	at	least
to	some	extent.	One	of	the	great	troubles	with	any	discourse	about	different	legal	cultures
is	the	distinction	between	religion	and	culture,	which	could	be	described	as	a	wrong
dichotomy.	In	fact,	a	discussion	about	a	dialogue	between	notions	of	civilization	and	culture
is	far	more	appropriate	in	this	instance.	Rather	than	religion	and	culture	or	religious	and
secular	cultures,	a	distinction	between	culture	and	civilization,	between	Rome	and	Athens,
works	better	when	we	speak	about	the	encounters	between	religious	and	secular	legal
cultures.	This	dichotomy	within	which	we	still	operate	represents	the	classical	distinction
between	a	cultivated	humanity	and	a	humanity	bound	by	its	civil	legal	boundaries.	The
former	is	bound	together	as	a	whole	and	fulfils	itself	in	its	togetherness	through	its	location,
political,	religious,	and	cultural	institutions.	Like	cultivated,	fertile	soil,	it	is	very	productive,
but	its	ingredients	cannot	be	deconstructed	or	taken	apart	without	deconstructing	the
whole	and	reducing	it	to	nothing.	Hence,	the	stranger	was	nobody	in	Athens,	and	to	be
turned	into	a	stranger	in	exile	was	considered	to	be	one	of	the	greatest	(p.232)
punishments.	Unsurprisingly,	the	term	for	culture	also	comes	from	the	verb	colo,	to
cultivate	the	ground.	This	model	is	commonly	compared	and	opposed	to	civilization:	a	civic
project	which	probably	begins	with	the	legacy	of	Alexander	the	Great	and	finds	its	fulfilment
in	the	Roman	model	of	civitas	which	binds	individuals	and	cultures	through	the	framework
of	Roman	law.	This	distinction	between	culture	and	civilization	therefore	becomes	far	more
important,	and	the	role	religion	plays	in	each	model	is	simply	different.	The	dilemma	we	have
is	actually	not	one	of	how	we	relate	secular	and	religious	legal	cultures,	but	of	how	a
civilization	driven	by	the	idea	of	the	rule	of	law	can	be	taken	on	board	without	absorbing
cultures	which	are	not	driven	by	the	idea	of	the	rule	of	law,	or	rather	cultures	which	do	not
view	the	rule	of	law	in	its	positive	dimension	as	a	constitutive	factor	of	what	makes	them	a
community	of	memory.	Empirical	scholars	such	as	Simmons	have	already	pursued	the
impact	of	majority	rule	of	law-driven	regimes;	her	research	has	argued	that	the	participation
of	liberal	democratic	states	in	an	international	legal	regime	of	human	rights	could	be
transformative	and	tends	to	foster	compliance	with	human	rights	in	other	(non-liberal
democratic)	states.66
What	are	the	possible	routes	through	which	public	international	law	could	take	on	board	the
parallel	voices	of	parallel	legal	culture	without	cancelling	one	or	the	other?	There	are	already
existing	premises	which	indicate	the	terms	that	would	enable	secular	and	religious	legal
cultures	to	calibrate	each	other’s	expectations	about	the	margins	of	religious	exceptionalism.
The	most	likely	beneficiaries	of	exceptionalism	are	likely	to	be	poor,	underdeveloped,	or	in
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some	other	way	disadvantaged	states	because	of	the	specially	onerous	burdens	that
conformity	with	international	human	rights	law	would	entail	for	such	states,	which	may
include	knowledge,	capacity,	grammar	of	political	and	legal	consent,	etc.	This	raises	the
possibility	that	societies	with	a	very	different	cultural	orientation	and	history	may	be	so
deeply	mired	in	certain	errors	and	misconceptions	that	they	are	seriously	impaired	in	their
capacity	to	grasp	the	legitimacy	of	much	beyond	perhaps	a	minimal	core	of	international
human	rights	law.	This	is	not	to	deny	that	these	societies	are	nonetheless	bound	by	human
rights	commitments,	although	their	historically	induced	misconceptions	may	generate	some
excuse	(not	justification)	for	non-compliance	with	international	law.	In	such	a	context
international	human	rights	law	may	lack	legitimacy	with	respect	to	these	societies	because	of
their	historical	experience	of	international	law	or	of	states	claiming	to	act	in	its	name.	In	these
cases	international	law	legitimacy	will	have	to	be	gained	or,	where	it	has	been	lost,	regained
through	engaging	exchanges	which	would	make	these	societies	more	committed	to	complex
international	legal	frameworks.	A	more	nuanced	conception	of	exceptionalism	emerging	from
the	dialogue	of	religions	and	non-religious	legal	cultures	and	at	the	same	time	reaffirming	the
existing	international	legal	(p.233)	 order	may	be	the	much	needed	narrative	which	would
strengthen	rather	than	weaken	the	human	rights	proliferation	in	a	religious	context	and	gain
the	much	needed	religious	endorsement	of	human	rights	and	international	law,	by	making
the	religious	voices	in	the	context	of	the	international	organizations	more	coherent,	less
parochial,	and	less	defensive.
It	is	conceivable	to	come	to	the	conclusion	that	certain	uncomfortable	conclusions	might
have	to	be	drawn	when	one	speaks	of	legal	and	religious	perspectives	about	international
law	and	human	rights.	The	longer	one	speaks	about	these	through	the	lenses	of	two
different	normative	orders,	the	clearer	it	is	that	these	two	normative	orders	are	simply	too
different	to	reconcile	except	as	parallel	orders	with	very	distinctive	functions.	Unless	a
conversation	between	these	two	distinct	legal	cultures	happens,	the	awareness	of	their
profound	differences	cannot	be	outlined	in	a	way	which	would	be	robust	enough	to	make
each	culture	aware	of	these	differences.	Without	such	a	dialogue,	religious	perspectives	of
international	law	and	human	rights	may	never	acknowledge	that	their	co-existence	with	the
non-religious	legal	order	is	by	default	historically	and	conceptually	anomalous.	For	example,
too	radical	rapprochement	with	secular	legal	culture	can	make	religious	legal	culture
potentially	un-eschatological	and	idolatrous	in	its	excessive	efforts	to	participate	in	any
number	of	social	engineering	projects,	and	could	debase	theologies	in	the	effort	to	fix	a
broken	world	through	legal	means.	In	this	sense,	an	engagement	with	the	system	of
international	law	from	religious	perspectives	may	have	to	come	about	through	theology	and
mission	and	prayer	for	political	authorities,	and	not	through	the	translation	of	international
law	into	theology	and	mission.	It	is	conceivable	that	there	could	be	different	concepts	of	law,
as	Burnside	and	Jackson	remind	us	in	their	reflection	on	the	nature	of	Biblical	law	in
comparison	with	our	modern	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law.67	It	is	possible	that	the
emerging	religious	perspectives	of	international	law	are	attempting	to	speak	of	concepts	of
law	which	are	far	less	preoccupied	with	enforcement	and	far	more	preoccupied	with
speaking	about	law	in	the	sense	that	Biblical	law	does—as	a	sacred	landscape,	a	manifesto	of
normative	community	of	memory	through	which	this	community	delimits	its	cultural
boundaries.	This	concept	of	law	is	very	different	from	the	concept	of	law	represented	by
public	international	law.	If	this	is	so,	it	presents	a	challenge	to	the	secular	religious	culture
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not	to	put	too	much	pressure	on	religious	legal	cultures	to	reinvent	themselves,	and	to	find
ways	to	embrace	an	idea	about	the	rule	of	law	which	is	not	and	cannot	be	reconciled	with
the	religious	idea	of	rule	of	law.	The	projects	involving	modernization	of	canon	law,	Jewish
law,	or	Islamic	law	may	be	miscalibrated:	they	may	represent	investment	in	efforts	to	make
these	laws	into	something	they	were	never	meant	to	be.	The	temptation	to	reconcile
different	normative	cultures	always	carries	the	caveat	that	any	such	project	effectively
interprets	culture	dia-bolically	instead	of	sym-bolically,	by	deconstructing	the	culture(s)	it
aims	to	reconcile.	Dia-bolical	(from	Greek	(p.234)	 throwing	apart),	in	theological	terms,
means	reconstructing	cultural	data	wrongly	by	separating	what	belongs	together.	It	is	a
divorce	at	ontological,	philosophical,	theological,	and	social	levels.	On	the	contrary,	symbolical
interpretation	from	the	Greek	word	‘throwing	together’,	attempts	reconstruct	cultural	data
rightly	by	putting	together	factors	which	at	first	seem	incompatible.68	There	has	been	too
much	‘throwing	apart’	and	very	little	‘putting	together’	in	the	process	of	constituting	a
dialogue	between	the	secular	and	religious	legal	cultures.	The	sooner	this	is	realized,	the
easier	it	will	be	for	religious	legal	perspectives	to	embrace	international	law	as	a	force	for
good	without	having	to	struggle	to	engage	with	it	theologically.	Similarly,	non-religious	legal
cultures	are	likely	to	do	less	preaching	about	the	human	rights-compliant	transformation	of
religious	legal	cultures	if	they	come	to	the	realization	that	religious	perspectives	are	more
likely	to	endorse	human	rights	and	international	law	not	because	they	have	to	be
theologically	compatible,	but	rather	because	they	provide	the	minimum	safeguards	for
religious	organizations	to	be	able	to	pursue	their	mission	without	undue	state	interference.
Notes:
(1)	Lecturer	in	Media	Law	and	Intellectual	Property	at	Brunel	Law	School,	Director	of
Religion,	Law	and	International	Relations	Programme	at	the	Centre	for	Christianity	and
Culture,	Regent’s	Park	College,	Oxford	and	a	Managing	Editor	of	the	Oxford	Journal	of	Law
and	Religion.
(2)	For	further	discussion	of	pluralism,	see	J	Tasioulas,	‘Parochialism	and	the	Legitimacy	of
International	Law’	in	Mortimer	NS	Sellers	(ed),	Parochialism,	Cosmopolitanism,	and	the
Foundations	of	International	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012).
(3)	Mark	Mazower,	‘No	Enchanted	Palace.’	The	End	of	Empire	and	the	Ideological	Origins
of	the	United	Nations	(Princeton	University	Press	2009).
(4)	Michael	Ignatieff	(ed),	American	Exceptionalism	and	Human	Rights	(Princeton	University
Press	2005).
(5)	John	Tasioulas,	‘Human	Rights,	Legitimacy,	and	International	Law’	(2013)	58(1)	Am	J
Jurisprudence	19.
(6)	Tasioulas	(n	5)	23.
(7)	For	example,	while	Shia	political	theology	could	construct	a	theologically	coherent
concept	of	political	authority,	the	four	schools	of	law	and	Sunni	theology	are	divided	about
the	theological	justification	of	any	political	authority.	See	A	O’Mahony,	W	Peterburs,	and	MA
Shomali,	A	Catholic-Shi’a	Engagement:	Faith	and	Reason	in	Theory	and	Practice	(Melisende
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theme	of	the	possibility	of	a	political	idolatry	in	the	context	of	Sunni	Islam	emerges	through
the	Muslim–Christian	engagement	in	PS	Fiddes,	‘The	Root	of	Religious	Freedom:
Interpreting	Some	Muslim	and	Christian	Sacred	Texts’	(2012)	1	OJLR	169.
(8)	Tasioulas	(n	5).
(9)	Tasioulas	(n	5)	20.
(10)	For	a	detailed	account	of	this	change	see	D	Jaeger’s	chapter	in	this	book.	See	also	WL
Portier,	‘Theology	of	Manners	as	Theology	of	Containment:	John	Courtney	Murray	and
“Dignitatis	Humanae”	Forty	Years	After’	(2006)	US	Catholic	Historian	83;	J	Sweeney,
‘Catholicism	and	Freedom:	Dignitatis	Humanae—the	Text	and	its	Reception’	(2006)	Reading
Religion	in	Context	17;	A	de	Dreuzy,	‘“Dignitatis	Humanae”	as	an	Encounter	between	Two
“Towering	Theologians”:	John	Courtney	Murray,	SJ,	and	Yves	Congar,	OP’	(2006)	US
Catholic	Historian	33;	TF	Farr,	‘Religious	Realism	in	Foreign	Policy:	Lessons	from	Vatican	II’
3(4)	Rev	Faith	&	Intl	Affairs	25;	KR	Craycraft,	Religion	as	Moral	Duty	and	Civic	Right:
Dignitatis	Humanae	on	Religious	Liberty	(Rowman	&	Littlefield	1995);	TF	Farr,	‘Dignitatis
Humanae	and	Religious	Freedom	in	American	Foreign	Policy:	A	Practitioner’s	Perspective’,
in	Kenneth	D	Whitehead	(ed),	After	40	Years:	Vatican	Council	II’s	Diverse	Legacy	(St
Augustine’s	Press	2007)	237;	KJ	Hasson,	‘Religious	Liberty	and	Human	Dignity:	A	Tale	of
Two	Declarations’	(2003)	27	Harv	JL	&	Pub	Poly	81.
(11)	The	Convention	of	the	Rights	of	the	Child	is	in	a	way	a	good	example	of	why	this	might
be	the	case.	The	latest	UN	Committee	Report	pretty	much	proposes	that	the	Holy	See
would	have	to	rewrite	the	entire	social	teaching	of	the	Catholic	Church	and	the	Code	of
Canon	Law	1983	(but	not	the	CCEO)	in	order	to	be	Convention	compliant.	See	‘UN
Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child.	Concluding	observations	on	the	second	periodic
report	of	the	Holy	See’,	for	example	CRC/C/VAT/CO/2.
(12)
Article	1	§	1.	The	State	of	Israel,	recalling	its	Declaration	of	Independence,	affirms	its
continuing	commitment	to	uphold	and	observe	the	human	right	to	freedom	of	religion	and
conscience,	as	set	forth	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	in	other
international	instruments	to	which	it	is	a	party.	§	2.	The	Holy	See,	recalling	the	Declaration	on
Religious	Freedom	of	the	Second	Vatican	Ecumenical	Council,	Dignitatis	humanae,	affirms
the	Catholic	Church’s	commitment	to	uphold	the	human	right	to	freedom	of	religion	and
conscience,	as	set	forth	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	in	other
international	instruments	to	which	it	is	a	party.
Conventio	Inter	Apostolicam	Sedem	Atque	Israelis	Statum	Fundamental	Agreement
Between	The	Holy	See	And	The	State	Of	Israel:
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-
st_19931230_santa-sede-israele_en.html>	accessed	5	November	2014.
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(13)	Y	Abdullah,	‘The	Holy	See	at	United	Nations	Conferences:	State	or	Church?’	(1996)
Columbia	L	Rev	1835;	HE	Cardinale,	The	Holy	See	and	the	International	Order	(Smythe
1976);	HF	Cumbo,	‘The	Holy	See	and	International	Law’	(1948)	Intl	LQ	603;	MN	Bathon,
‘The	Atypical	International	Status	of	the	Holy	See’	(2001)	34	Vand	J	Transnatl	L	597;	F
Cammeo,	G	Dalla	Torre,	and	A	Sodano,	Ordinamento	giuridico	dello	Stato	della	Città	del
Vaticano	(Libreria	editrice	vaticana	2002);	W	Hilgeman,	G	Corbellini,	and	Pontificia
Universitas	Lateranensis.	Institutum	utriusque	iuris,	L’ordinamento	giuridico	dello	Stato
della	Città	del	Vaticano:	origine	ed	evoluzione	(Lateran	University	Press,	2012);	A	Sarais
and	F	Coccopalmerio,	La	cittadinanza	vaticana	(Città	del	Vaticano:	Libreria	editrice	vaticana
2012);	Heribert	Franz	Köck,	Die	völkerrechtliche	Stellung	des	Heiligen	Stuhls:	dargestellt
an	seinen	Beziehungen	zu	Staaten	und	internationalen	Organisationen	(Duncker	&
Humblot	1975).
(14)	P	Petkoff,	‘Legal	Perspectives	and	Religious	Perspectives	of	Religious	Rights	under
International	Law	in	the	Vatican	Concordats	(1963–2004)’	(2007)	158	Law	&	Just-Christian	L
Rev	30.	A	good	overview	of	the	Holy	See’s	bilateralism	can	also	be	found	in	D	Němec,
Concordat	Agreements	between	the	Holy	See	and	the	Post-Communist	Countries	(1990–
2010)	(Peeters	2012).
(15)	On	the	post-Vatican	II	Augustinian	approach	to	concordats	via	the	vision	of	the	Church
as	a	pilgrim	on	a	journey	see	Petkoff	(n	14).
(16)	Compare	the	Preamble	of	the	Cairo	Declaration:
Reaffirming	the	civilizing	and	historical	role	of	the	Islamic	Ummah	which	God	made	the	best
nation	that	has	given	mankind	a	universal	and	well-balanced	civilization	in	which	harmony	is
established	between	this	life	and	the	hereafter	and	knowledge	is	combined	with	faith;	and
the	role	that	this	Ummah	should	play	to	guide	a	humanity	confused	by	competing	trends
and	ideologies	and	to	provide	solutions	to	the	chronic	problems	of	this	materialistic
civilization	and	ARTICLE	10:	Islam	is	the	religion	of	unspoiled	nature.	It	is	prohibited	to
exercise	any	form	of	compulsion	on	man	or	to	exploit	his	poverty	or	ignorance	in	order	to
convert	him	to	another	religion	or	to	atheism	with	the	Orthodox	‘Bill	of	Rights’:
Every	individual	is	endowed	by	God	with	dignity	and	freedom.	The	use	of	this	freedom	for
evil	purposes	however	will	inevitably	lead	to	the	derogation	of	one’s	own	dignity	and
humiliation	of	the	dignity	of	others.	A	society	should	establish	mechanisms	restoring
harmony	between	human	dignity	and	freedom.	In	social	life,	the	concept	of	human	rights	and
morality	can	and	must	serve	this	purpose.	At	the	same	time	these	two	notions	are	bound	up
at	least	by	the	fact	that	morality,	that	is,	the	ideas	of	sin	and	virtue,	always	precede	law,
which	has	actually	arisen	from	these	ideas.	That	is	why	any	erosion	of	morality	will	ultimately
lead	to	the	erosion	of	legality.	The	concept	of	human	rights	has	undergone	a	long	historical
evolution	and	precisely	for	this	reason	cannot	be	made	absolute	in	their	today’s
understanding.	It	is	necessary	to	give	a	clear	definition	to	Christian	values	with	which	human
rights	should	be	harmonized.	III.	Human	rights	in	Christian	worldview	and	in	the	life	of
society.
The	Russian	Orthodox	Church’s	Basic	Teaching	on	Human	Dignity,	Freedom	and	Rights:
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<https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/>	accessed	5	November	2014.
(17)	See	Article	24	of	Cairo	Declaration:	‘All	the	rights	and	freedoms	stipulated	in	this
Declaration	are	subject	to	the	Islamic	Shari’ah’.	See	also	Article	25,	which	stipulates	that
‘[t]he	Islamic	Shari’ah	is	the	only	source	of	reference	for	the	explanation	or	clarification	of
any	of	the	articles	of	this	Declaration’,	as	well	as	the	concluding	section	of	III	5	of	the
Orthodox	‘Bill	of	Rights’:
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	Orthodox	Church	the	political	and	legal	institution	of	human
rights	can	promote	the	good	goals	of	protecting	human	dignity	and	contribute	to	the
spiritual	and	ethical	development	of	the	personality.	To	make	it	possible	the	implementation	of
human	rights	should	not	come	into	conflict	with	God-established	moral	norms	and	traditional
morality	based	on	them.	One’s	human	rights	cannot	be	set	against	the	values	and	interests
of	one’s	homeland,	community	and	family.	The	exercise	of	human	rights	should	not	be	used
to	justify	any	encroachment	on	religious	holy	symbols	things,	cultural	values	and	the	identity
of	a	nation.	Human	rights	cannot	be	used	as	a	pretext	for	inflicting	irretrievable	damage	on
nature.
These	texts	do	suggest	a	possibility	of	a	derogation	from	any	international	commitments
which	may	be	perceived	as	contrary	to	the	precepts	of	Islamic	law	or	Orthodox	theology.
This	appears	to	be	a	very	different	approach	from	Dignitatis	Humanae,	which	seems	to	have
achieved	a	breakthrough	in	the	separation	of	the	endorsement	of	human	rights	by	the
Roman	Catholic	Church	and	the	placing	of	the	responsibility	to	protect	human	rights	on
states	rather	than	on	organized	religions.	Both	the	Cairo	Declaration	and	the	Orthodox	‘Bill
of	Rights’	seem	to	do	the	opposite—they	place	a	responsibility	upon	the	states	to	protect
doctrinal	orthodoxy.
(18)	According	to	Foreign	Minister	S	Lavrov:	Russia’s	MOFA	maintains	the	closest	ties	with
the	Russian	Orthodox	Church,	which	is	the	church	most	Russians	belong	to.	Our
cooperation	is	one	of	the	long-time	traditions	of	domestic	diplomacy.	We	value	the	influence
Orthodoxy	had	on	the	formation	of	our	statehood,	the	shaping	of	culture	and	molding	of	the
consciousness	of	Russia’s	multi-ethnic	people.	We	also	commend	the	role	played	by	the
Russian	Orthodox	Church	in	the	life	of	present-day	Russia	as	one	of	the	consolidating	forces
of	Russian	society.
Sergei	Lavrov,	‘Diplomacy	Needs	a	Moral	Foundation’,	Diplomat,	September	2008,	at	3–4.
(19)	The	Russian	Orthodox	Church’s	Basic	Teaching	on	Human	Dignity,	Freedom	and
Rights	(n	16).	This	document	should	be	studied	in	connection	with	The	Russian	Orthodox
Church’s	Approach	to	Willful	Public	Blasphemy	and	Slander	against	the	Church:
<https://mospat.ru/en/documents/otnoshenie-russkojj-pravoslavnojj-cerkvi-k-
namerennomu-publichnomu-bogokhulstvu-i-klevete-v-adres-cerkvi/>	accessed	5
November	2014	and	The	Basis	of	the	Social	Concept	of	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church:
<https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/>	accessed	5	November	2014.
(20)	‘The	Cairo	Declaration	On	Human	Rights	In	Islam’:	<http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/article/human.htm>	accessed	5	November	2014.
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(21)	Compare	particularly	the	CDHRI	Preamble:
Believing	that	fundamental	rights	and	universal	freedoms	in	Islam	are	an	integral	part	of	the
Islamic	religion	and	that	no	one	as	a	matter	of	principle	has	the	right	to	suspend	them	in
whole	or	in	part	or	violate	or	ignore	them	in	as	much	as	they	are	binding	divine
commandments,	which	are	contained	in	the	Revealed	Books	of	God	and	were	sent	through
the	last	of	His	Prophets	to	complete	the	preceding	divine	messages	thereby	making	their
observance	an	act	of	worship	and	their	neglect	or	violation	an	abominable	sin,	and
accordingly	every	person	is	individually	responsible—and	the	Ummah	collectively
responsible—for	their	safeguard
.
and	the	Preamble	of	the	Orthodox	‘Bill	of	Rights’:
In	the	world	today	there	is	a	widespread	conviction	that	the	human	rights	institution	in	itself
can	promote	in	the	best	possible	way	the	development	of	human	personality	and	social
organization.	At	the	same	time,	human	rights	protection	is	often	used	as	a	plea	to	realize
ideas	which	in	essence	radically	disagree	with	Christian	teaching.	Christians	have	found
themselves	in	a	situation	where	public	and	social	structures	can	force	and	often	have
already	forced	them	to	think	and	act	contrary	to	God’s	commandments,	thus	obstructing
their	way	towards	the	most	important	goal	in	human	life,	which	is	deliverance	from	sin	and
finding	salvation…
.
(this	should	be	read	in	connection	with	chapter	16	of	the	Social	Teaching	of	the	Russian
Orthodox	Church,	as	well	as	in	connection	with	chapter	XVI.	4	of	ROC’s	Social	Doctrine):
The	contemporary	international	legal	system	is	based	on	the	priority	given	to	the	interests	of
the	earthly	life	of	man	and	human	communities	over	religious	values	(especially	in	those
cases	when	the	former	and	the	latter	come	into	conflict).	This	priority	is	sealed	in	the	national
legislation	of	many	countries.	It	is	often	built	in	the	principles	regulating	various	activities	of
the	governmental	bodies,	public	educational	system,	etc.	Many	influential	public	mechanisms
use	the	same	principle	in	their	open	confrontation	with	faith	and	the	Church,	aimed	to	oust
them	from	public	life.	These	manifestations	create	a	general	picture	of	the	secularisation	of
public	and	social	life.	While	respecting	the	worldview	of	non-religious	people	and	their	right
to	influence	social	processes,	the	Church	cannot	favour	a	world	order	that	puts	in	the
centre	of	everything	the	human	personality	darkened	by	sin.	This	is	why,	invariably	open	to
co-operation	with	people	of	non-religious	convictions,	the	Church	seeks	to	assert	Christian
values	in	the	process	of	decision-making	on	the	most	important	public	issues	both	on	national
and	international	levels.	She	strives	for	the	recognition	of	the	legality	of	religious	worldview
as	a	basis	for	socially	significant	action	(including	those	taken	by	state)	and	as	an	essential
factor	which	should	influence	the	development	(amendment)	of	international	law	and	the
work	of	international	organisations.
(22)	For	an	overview	of	the	evolution	of	defamation	of	religions	debates	see	the	Policy
Focus	of	the	USCIRF:	<http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/defamation-of-religions>	accessed	5
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November	2014.	ROC,	the	Holy	See,	and	OIC	frequently	supported	the	concept	of
defamation	of	religion	in	the	context	of	the	international	organizations.	The	ROC	and	OIC
approaches	can	be	traced	through	Article	22	CDHRI.	The	ROC	Approach	to	Blasphemy	can
be	found	at	<https://mospat.ru/en/documents/	otnoshenie-russkojj-pravoslavnojj-cerkvi-k-
namerennomu-publichnomu-bogokhulstvu-i-klevete-v-adres-cerkvi/>	accessed	5
November	2014.	A	number	of	defamation	of	religion	resolutions	sponsored	by	OIC	were
sponsored	before	the	UN	and	were	adopted	by	the	HRC	Commission	on	Human	Rights
Res	2000/84,	Defamation	of	Religions,	67th	mtg,	UN	Doc	E/CN4/RES/2000/84	(26	April
2000);	Commission	on	Human	Rights	Res	2001/4,	Combating	Defamation	of	Religions	as	a
Means	to	Promote	Human	Rights,	Social	Harmony	and	Religious	and	Cultural	Diversity,
61st	mtg,	UN	Doc	E/CN4/Res/2001/4	(18	April	2001);	Commission	on	Human	Rights	Res
2002/9,	Combating	Defamation	of	Religion,	39th	mtg.	UN	Doc	E/CN4/RES/2002/9	(15	April
2002);	Commission	on	Human	Rights	Res	2003/4,	Combating	Defamation	of	Religions,	47th
mtg,	UN	Doc	E/CN4/Res/2003/4	(14	April	2003);	Commission	on	Human	Rights	Res	2004/6,
Combating	Defamation	of	Religion,	45th	mtg,	UN	Doc	E/CN4/RES/2004/6	(13	April	2004);
Commission	on	Human	Rights	Resolution	2005/3,	Combating	Defamation	of	Religions,	44th
mtg,	UN	Doc	E/CNr4/Res/2005/3	(12	April	2005);	Human	Rights	Council	[HRC]	Resolution
4/9,	31st	mtg,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/RES/4/9	(30	March	2007);	HRC	Resolution	7/19,	Combating
Defamation	of	Religions,	40th	mtg,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/RES/7/19	(27	March	2008);	HRC	Res
10/22,	Combating	Defamation	of	Religions,	43rd	mtg,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/RES/10/22	(26	March
2009);	HRC	Res	13/16,	Combating	Defamation	of	Religions,	42nd	mtg,	UN	Doc
A/HRC/RES/13/16	(25	March	2010)	and	the	UN	General	Assembly	GA	Res	60/150,	UN	Doc
A/RES/60/150	(16	December	2005);	GA	Res	61/164,	UN	Doc	A/RES/61/164	(19	December
2006);	GA	Res	62/154,	UN	Doc	A/RES/62/154	(18	December	2007);	GA	Res	63/171,	UN
Doc	A/RES/63/171	(18	December	2008);	GA	Res	64/156,	UN	Doc	A/RES/64/156	(18
December	2009);	GA	Res	65/224,	UN	Doc	A/RES/65/224	(21	December	2010).	From	2011
onwards	the	UN	moved	away	from	the	concept	of	‘defamation	of	religions’.	In	2011,	the
HRC	adopted	a	resolution	entitled	‘Combating	Intolerance,	Negative	Stereotyping	and
Stigmatization	of,	and	Discrimination,	Incitement	to	Violence	and	Violence	Against,	Persons
Based	on	Religion	or	Belief’	(HRC	Resolution	16/18,	46th	mtg,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/RES/16/18
(24,	2011))	while	the	General	Assembly	adopted	a	resolution	entitled	‘United	against
Racism,	Racial	Discrimination,	Xenophobia	and	Related	Intolerance’	in	September	2011:	GA
Res	66/3,	UN	Doc	A/RES/66/3	(22	September	2011).	The	General	Assembly	adopted	a
further	resolution	in	December	2011	on	combating	intolerance,	negative	stereotyping,
stigmatization	of,	and	discrimination,	incitement	to	violence,	and	violence	against	persons
based	on	religion	or	belief	(GA	Res	66/167,	UN	Doc	A/RES/66/167	(19	December	2011)).
(23)	See	for	example	Arts	10	and	22	CDHRI,	ch	6,	Basic	Principles	of	Attitude	to	the	Non-
Orthodox:	<https://mospat.ru/en/documents/attitude-to-the-non-orthodox/vi/>	accessed	5
November	2014.
(24)	Chapter	10	of	the	ROC	Social	Doctrine:	<https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-
concepts/kh/>	accessed	5	November	2014	and	ch	2	of	the	ROC	‘Bill	of	Rights’:
<https://mospat.ru/en/	documents/dignity-freedom-rights/ii/>	accessed	5	November	2014.
(25)	Articles	7	and	9	CDHRI;	IV.6	ROCHRB;	ROCBSC	X,	14.
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(26)	Article	7	CDHRI;	CRCI,	ROCBSC	X,	14.
(27)	‘The	Shariah	is	never	closed,	for	it	is	based	not	on	a	core	of	concepts,	but	rather	on	an
ensemble	of	precepts	which	is	at	times	general,	at	times	precise,	and	which	expands	to
include	the	totality	of	human	acts	through	induction,	analogy,	extension,	commentary,	and
interpretation.’	O	Roy	and	C	Volk,	The	Failure	of	Political	Islam	(Harvard	University	Press
1994)	10.
(28)	Tasioulas	(n	5).
(29)	Organization	of	the	Islamic	Conference	(OIC),	Cairo	Declaration	on	Human	Rights	in
Islam,	5	August	1990:	<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3822c.html>	accessed	5
November	2014;	Organization	of	the	Islamic	Conference	(OIC),	Convention	of	the
Organisation	of	the	Islamic	Conference	on	Combating	International	Terrorism,	1	July	1999,
Annex	to	Resolution	No	59/26-P.
(30)	Organization	of	the	Islamic	Conference	(OIC),	Covenant	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	in
Islam,	June	2005,	OIC/9-IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep.Final,	Adopted	by	the	32nd	Islamic
Conference	of	Foreign	Ministers	in	Sana’a,	Republic	of	Yemen,	in	June	2005.
(31)	Statute	of	the	IPHRC	OIC/CFM-38/2011/LEG/RES/FINAL.
(32)	An	attempt	to	engage	with	a	proportionality	test	in	the	application	of	Sharia	is	apparent	in
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Religious Exceptionalism, Religious Rights,  and Public International Law
Page 26 of 26
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of
Oxford; date: 02 June 2015
governs	least,	governs	best.	Rather	it	defines	good	government	intervention	as	that	which
truly	‘helps’	other	social	groups	contribute	to	the	common	good	by	directing,	urging,
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demands’.
US	Catholic	Bishops	(1986)	‘Economic	Justice	for	All,	Pastoral	Letter	on	Catholic	Social
Teaching	and	the	US	Economy’	124:	<http://www.osjspm.org/cst/eja.htm>	accessed	5
November	2014.
(66)	Beth	A	Simmons,	Mobilizing	for	Human	Rights:	International	Law	in	Domestic	Politics
(Oxford	University	Press	2009).	Simmons’	important	work	relates	to	the	efficacy	of
international	human	rights	treaties	and	she	rightly	cautions	against	extrapolating	from	these
findings	to	other	sources	of	international	human	rights	law,	such	as	customary	international
law,	which	are	not	based	in	the	same	way	on	an	explicit	law-like	commitment.
(67)	JP	Burnside,	God,	Justice,	and	Society:	Aspects	of	Law	and	Legality	in	the	Bible
(Oxford	University	Press	2011);	BS	Jackson,	Studies	in	the	Semiotics	of	Biblical	Law
(Sheffield	Academic	Press	2000).
(68)	EG	Farrugia,	‘The	Recurrent	Crisis	of	Iconoclasm’	in	Farrugia,	Tradition	and
Transition:	The	Vitality	of	the	Christian	East	(Mar	Thoma	Yogam	1996)	16–17.
Access	brought	to	you	by: 	University	of	Oxford
